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1.1  Introduction 
U.S. personal income tax rates changed dramatically during the 1980s, espe- 
cially at the top of  the income distribution. In 1980, the top marginal tax rate 
(at the federal level) was 70 percent. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
(ERTA) reduced that rate to 50 percent,  and the Tax  Reform Act  of  1986 
(TRA86) reduced it further to 28 percent. A dominant motivation for the initial 
law was to alleviate the disincentives for individuals to supply labor and to 
save that  were  generated by  the high marginal  tax rates.  For labor  supply, 
ERTA pursued this goal by introducing a deduction for the secondary earner 
in the household and, more generally, by  reducing  marginal tax rates by  23 
percent within each tax bracket. 
By providing large and potentially exogenous variation in marginal tax rates, 
these tax laws provide fertile ground for analyzing the responsiveness of  indi- 
vidual behavior to taxes. Evidence suggests that individual behavior did re- 
spond to the incentives in these tax laws. Lindsey (1987) and Navratil (1994) 
use tax return data and find that the marginal tax rate reductions in ERTA had 
a significant effect on taxable income. Feldstein (1993) and Auten and Carroll 
(1994) find similar results for TRA86. Burtless (1991) and Bosworth and Burt- 
less (1992) study the labor supply responses to the tax reforms of the 1980s. 
These  studies  analyze  the trend  in labor supply  for different  demographic 
groups using Current Population Survey (CPS) data for 1968-88 and 1968-90, 
respectively. They find significant responses in hours of work (relative to trend) 
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by married  women at the top and bottom  of  the income distribution.  Eissa 
(1995) also finds a strong response by upper-income women to TRA86. 
This paper examines whether married women responded to the incentives to 
increase labor supply in ERTA, using individual-level data rather than aggre- 
gated data (as in the case of Bosworth and Burtless 1992). I focus on married 
women for two reasons. First, ERTA implicitly targeted this group in the intro- 
duction of the secondary earner deduction.  Second, this group is believed to 
be more responsive to changes in the tax rate than any other group (men and 
female  heads  of  households).  While  the  empirical  literature  is  in  less 
agreement on  the  overall  responsiveness  of  married  women  than  of  other 
groups, it is generally accepted that it is the participation decision rather than 
the hours-of-work decision for working women that is responsive. I therefore 
analyze these two margins separately. 
I use the time variation in marginal tax rates to estimate both difference-in- 
difference regression models (where I compare the change in labor supply for 
upper-income  women  with  the  change  in  labor  supply  for  lower-income 
women) and standard labor supply models (where labor supply is a function of 
the after-tax wage). This approach is appealing in that it allows me to address a 
standard criticism of the empirical analysis of taxation and labor supply. Be- 
cause cross-sectional  variation in marginal tax  rates  derives primarily  from 
differences in income and family structure, the existing literature faces an iden- 
tification problem. Separating the tax effect from a nonlinear income (or fam- 
ily structure) effect is difficult in the cross section. ERTA, however, generated 
potentially exogenous time variation in marginal rates that can be used to eval- 
uate the responsiveness of labor supply to taxes. 
Using data from the  1981 and  1985 CPS, I find weak evidence that labor 
force participation of upper-income married women is responsive to taxes. The 
point estimates suggest that following ERTA, upper-income  married women 
increased their labor force participation by up to 2.6 percentage points (from 
a predicted base of 47 percent). That estimate suggests an elasticity of 0.79. 
For working women, the most likely values show a response of between  20 
and 49 hours per year, but these are estimated with such imprecision that it is 
not possible to rule out no response at all. Finally, standard labor supply esti- 
mates  predict  participation  and  hours-of-work  responses  for upper-income 
women that are at the lower end of the observed responses. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section  1.2 presents a quick review of 
the tax and labor supply literature. To motivate the regressions estimated in the 
paper,  I  first review the basic model of labor supply and outline some basic 
assumptions maintained for the analysis of labor supply within the household. 
To place the current paper in context, I present a brief review of the empirical 
labor supply literature. Section 1.3 reviews the provisions in ERTA relevant for 
the treatment of earned income. Section 1.4  presents the identification strategy, 
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discusses the data and presents basic labor supply results. The difference-in- 
difference specification and regression results are presented in section 1.6, and 
the standard labor supply estimates are presented in section 1.7. Finally, sec- 
tion 1.8 concludes. 
1.2  Tax and Labor Supply Literature 
1.2.1  Model of Labor Supply 
To motivate the labor supply equations that I estimate, I sketch below the 
simple model of taxes and labor supply. I use the basic static, two-good labor 
supply model. In this model, the worker has a utility function defined over 
consumption and leisure and chooses her hours of work at a fixed wage. The 
optimization problem is typically characterized as follows: 
(1)  max u(c,l)  such that [wh -  G(wh,y)] + y = c, 
where u(c, I)  is the utility function, c is consumption of a composite commod- 
ity (the numeraire),  1 is leisure, wh  is the woman’s labor income (the product 
of the wage and hours of work), y is unearned income, and G(wh, y) is the tax 
liability. The partial derivative of utility with respect to leisure, u,, is positive, 
and the second partial, u,,, is negative. 
The function G(.) can incorporate nonlinearities and nonconvexities of the 
budget set due to several features of the tax system, such as the social security 
payroll tax, the earned income tax credit, and transfer programs. The marginal 
tax rate, 8, is the derivative of the function G(.) with respect to labor income. 
At interior solutions, the equality of the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure (MRS) and the net wage determines labor supply: 
With a nonlinear budget  set, the choice of hours and consumption deter- 
mines the segment of  the budget constraint on which the individual locates. 
For local movements, behavior is equivalent to that arising from utility maxim- 
ization subject to a linear budget constraint with the net wage, w(l -@), and 
“virtual” income given by the intercept of that budget segment with the con- 
sumption  axis. Theory predicts  that  the  income effect is negative because 
greater income leads one to purchase more leisure (assuming that leisure is a 
normal good). Theory provides little guidance on the effect of  the net wage, 
however, because the substitution effect from a tax cut leads to an increase in 
labor supply while the income effect leads to greater consumption of leisure. 
This paper analyzes separately two measures of labor supply: participation 
and hours of  work conditional  on working. Because no attempt is made to 
explicitly address the nonlinearity of the budget set, one can characterize the 
participation decision as a function of the MRS at zero hours and the after-tax 
u,luc = w(l -  8). 8  Nada Eissa 
market  wage.’  If  the  individual  has  unearned  income,  an  uncompensated 
change in the tax rate has an ambiguous effect on the participation margin. 
Unearned income for a married woman includes her spouse’s earned income 
and is therefore affected by the spouse’s labor supply decisions. I assume that 
the interaction between the husband’s and wife’s labor supply is governed by 
the chauvinist model. In that model, the wife conditions her labor supply on 
her spouse’s labor supply decision, making her the  secondary earner in the 
household. The husband’s earned income affects the wife’s labor supply only 
through an income effect. This model is useful for two reasons: the household’s 
capital income and the husband’s total  labor income generate an exogenous 
measure of  unearned income, and the first-hour marginal tax rate faced by the 
wife is her spouse’s last-hour marginal rate. The chauvinist model is clearly 
not valid for some households. One could use more general models that allow, 
for example, an interaction between one partner’s wage and the other partner’s 
labor supply. Evidence suggests, however, that such models do not produce 
very different estimates of the wage elasticity of labor supply (Hausman and 
Ruud 1984). 
1.2.2  Empirical Labor Supply Literature 
The empirical literature on taxation  and labor supply is extensive and em- 
ploys several approaches to estimating labor supply equations. The early litera- 
ture posited a linear budget constraint (i.e., a proportional tax) and estimated 
a structural labor supply equation of the form 
(2) 
where hf  is annual (or weekly) hours of work, XI  is a set of individual character- 
istics, w,“  is the after-tax hourly wage, and y, is unearned income. 
Researchers used ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) to estimate the hours-of-work equations (Boskin 1973; Hall 1973). Es- 
timates from this early work generally found large wage and income elasticit- 
ies for married  women.  Killingsworth  and Heckman’s  (1  986) review  of  the 
literature cites a range of  estimated wage elasticities of  -0.3  to 14, with  a 
tendency toward 1. More specific to taxation, Hausman (1985) cites a range of 
estimates of  -0.3  to 2.3. Mroz (1987) showed that this elasticity is closer to 
zero for working married women, but his estimates also suggest that the partic- 
ipation decision may be quite sensitive to the wage. This result is also found 
in recent work using the nonlinear budget set approach identified with Haus- 
man (1981). 
Hausman (1981) assumes a functional form for taxpayers’ preferences and 
then estimates preference parameters by solving an optimizing model in which 
the nonlinear and nonconvex budget constraints facing taxpayers are carefully 
h3 = soy  + 6,w,” + 6,y, + &, , 
I, Nonconvexities  in  the budget  constraint invalidate  this decision process  because the entire 
budget constraint and not just the marginal tax rate on the participation margin determine whether 
the individual enters the labor force (Hausman 1980). 9  Labor Supply and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of  1981 
modeled. Using maximum likelihood methods and cross-sectional data from 
the 1975 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Hausman estimates a net 
wage elasticity of approximately 1 for mamed women. Using a similar meth- 
odology and 1984 PSID data, Triest (1990) estimates a total labor supply elas- 
ticity of  1.1 for married women. However, he estimates an elasticity of only 
0.2 for working married women. Triest’s results provide further support for the 
view that the participation decision is more responsive to changes in the net 
wage than are hours conditional to working. 
While the careful modeling of the nonlinearity of the budget set is appeal- 
ing, this approach faces two critical problems. First, the results are quite sensi- 
tive to the specification of preferences chosen (Blundell and Meghir  1986), 
and even under similar preference  specifications, results do not seem to be 
replicable across different data sets and time periods (MaCurdy, Green, and 
Paarsch  1990). Second, constraints that make the models tractable appear to 
be binding and heavily influence the results (Heckman 1982; MaCurdy et al. 
1990). MacCurdy et al. show that the nonlinear budget set approach imposes 
the Slutsky condition, which amounts to restricting the income effect to be 
negative. Even when  the nonlinear budget  constraint  approach is not used, 
structural labor supply models are extremely sensitive to the specification cho- 
sen (Mroz 1987). 
An alternative approach to identifying labor supply responsiveness is to ex- 
amine the response of taxpayers to changes in tax laws (Eissa 1995; Blundell, 
Duncan,  and  Meghir  1995). Eissa  analyzes  the  responsiveness  of  upper- 
income married women to the large tax reductions in TRA86. That paper uses 
a difference-in-difference approach and compares the labor supply response of 
married women at the 99th percentile of the CPS income distribution to women 
at the 75th and 90th percentiles of the same distribution. Blundell et al. use the 
several tax reforms in England during the 1980s to estimate a structural model 
of labor supply that allows them to distinguish between income and substitu- 
tion effects. The advantage of  this approach is that it relies on minimal and 
transparent assumptions for identification. 
This paper follows in the line of the natural experiment approach. Before I 
discuss the methodology, I review the relevant features of ERTA. 
1.3  Economic Recovery Tax Act of  1981 
Before 1981, the U.S. federal tax schedule consisted of 16 brackets, ranging 
from 11 to 70 percent. The highest rate applied to individuals with taxable 
income over $215,400. Table  1.1 presents  the  statutory federal income tax 
schedule for 1980. At higher income tax brackets, earned income was taxed at 
a lower rate than unearned income. The lower tax rate on earned income was 
due to the “maximum tax,” passed as part of the Tax Reform Act of  1969. The 
maximum tax provided tax relief to taxpayers with substantial earned income 
so that the marginal rate on earned income did not exceed 50 percent. In fact, 10  Nada Eissa 
Table 1.1  Statutory Federal Individual Income Tax Schedule for Married, 
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complications in the law meant that the maximum tax on earned income could 
have exceeded 50 percent.2 
In addition  to the federal income tax, taxpayers  faced the social security 
payroll tax (equal to 6.13 percent on the empl~yee)~  and state taxes. Although 
the statutory  state tax rate could have been as high as 16 percent (in Minne- 
sota), the deductibility of state taxes from federal taxable income reduces the 
effective marginal tax rate. Nonetheless, for many secondary earners in high- 
income households, the marginal tax rate for the first hour of work cohld have 
far exceeded the federal rate of 50 per~ent.~ 
2. Not all taxpayers with taxable income in the relevant brackets were eligible for the maximum 
tax: married taxpayers had to file joint tax returns and have taxable earned income more than the 
amount that faced the 50 percent rate ($60,000 in 1980) to be eligible. In addition, eligible taxpay- 
ers who were in the relevant brackets because they had substantial unearned income did not see 
marginal tax rates on earned income fall to 50 percent (see Lindsey 1981 for a discussion of the 
workings of the maximum tax). Lindsey estimates that most taxpayers eligible for the maximum 
tax faced marginal rates of more than 50 percent in 1977. 
3. The social security tax is a payroll tax and therefore applies even to secondary earners in the 
highest tax brackets if their own earnings are below the social security maximum taxable earnings 
($25,900 in 1980). 
4. For a taxpayer with $55,000 of taxable earned (and $25,000 unearned) income, the marginal 
tax rate on earned income would be 69 percent ((55 percent federal tax + 12.26 percent FICA tax 
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ERTA reduced marginal tax rates by 23 percent within each bracket over a 
period of three years: by  10 percent in 1982, another 10 percent in 1983 (such 
that they  were 19 percent below their pre-ERTA levels), and by  5 percent in 
1984.5  ERTA  abolished the maximum tax on earned income and set the top 
marginal tax rate at 50 percent as of  1982. ERTA  also provided two-earner 
married couples with a deduction equal to  10 percent of  the income of  the 
lower-earning spouse (up to $30,000).6  The aim of this provision was to reduce 
the disincentive effects of high marginal rates on secondary earners. In effect, 
the deduction provided larger tax reductions for secondary earners at higher 
levels of the income distribution: it reduced the marginal rate by 5 percentage 
points for a secondary earner in the 50 percent bracket, but only 1 percentage 
point for a secondary earner in the 11 percent bracket. The federal statutory 
income tax schedule for 1984 is also presented in table 1.1. 
Because the tax code was not indexed for inflation during this period, tax- 
payers were likely to find themselves in higher brackets with no real increase 
in income. In practice, bracket creep is important in this analysis for two rea- 
sons. First, inflation was high during the period in which ERTA took effect: 
between 1980 and 1984, prices increased by 26 percent. Second, jumping into 
higher brackets was easy because income tax brackets were narrow. Table  1.1 
includes the CPI adjustment factor for 1984 to allow comparison of marginal 
tax rates between years. Consider the taxpayer with taxable income of $20,000 
in 1980. Her marginal tax rate was 24 percent in 1980. If her income increased 
by the CPI each year and ERTA was not passed, she would have faced a mar- 
ginal rate of  32 percent in  1984. ERTA  reduced the marginal rate in the 32 
percent bracket to 25 percent. Rather than fall by 23 percent, this taxpayer’s 
federal marginal rate increased by 4 percent, from 24 to 25 percent.’ In effect, 
bracket creep eroded most  of  the tax  gains for lower-income and middle- 
income taxpayers (Lindsey 1987), thus leaving upper-income taxpayers as the 
main beneficiaries of the 198  1 tax law. How much very high income individu- 
als gained from ERTA depends heavily on whether the maximum tax capped 
marginal rates at 50 percent in 1980, however. 
Unlike TRA86, ERTA  represented an uncompensated tax change. ERTA 
contained few provisions that affected the tax base except for the expanded 
eligibility for IRAs and the secondary earner deduction. Thus, net-of-tax in- 
comes rose because the tax on the family fell. Lindsey (1987) estimates that 
ERTA reduced tax liability by 26.8 percent in 1984. This feature of the tax law 
generates an income effect and affects the interpretation of the results, an issue 
I return to later. 
5. In 1981 a credit of  1.25 percent was given against regular taxes. 
6. The secondary earner deduction was only 5 percent in  1982. 
7. If eligible for the secondary earner deduction, her marginal tax rate in 1984 would have been 
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1.4  Identification Strategy 
I compare the change in labor supply of women “most” affected by ERTA 
(the treatment  group)  with  women  “less”  affected  by  the  law  (the control 
group) before and after the tax reform. The treatment here is the change in the 
marginal tax rate, or more generally the change in the budget set. Marginal tax 
rates are not available in the survey data, however. I use income as a proxy for 
the marginal tax rate because ERTA provided greater tax reductions for women 
in higher-income households than for women in lower-income households. 
The choice of groups from different points on the income distribution gener- 
ates a potential endogeneity problem. If the allocation is made based on family 
income, those who respond to the tax changes (high earners after 1981)  are the 
treatment group. This selection process biases upward the estimated response 
and labor supply elasticity of the treatment group. To remove this bias, the 
choice of the treatment and control groups before and after the tax law is based 
on “other household income”-the  sum of husband’s labor income and any 
nonlabor  income  received  by  the  family.  I  choose  women  with  real  other 
household income of at least $50,000 as the treatment group and women with 
other household income between $30,000 and $50,000 as the control group.R 
The effect of the tax law is then the difference between the change in labor 
supply of these two groups. 
This  difference-in-difference  approach  requires  that  assignment  into  the 
treatment and the control groups be random. Since these groups are at different 
points along the income distribution, there are likely to be systematic differ- 
ences in their characteristics. In addition, the composition of working women 
may change over the period if there is a participation response and new entrants 
are different from those already in the labor force. With nonrandom assign- 
ment, differences in labor market outcomes may reflect the noncomparability 
of the two groups rather than the effect of the tax law. To guard against this 
possibility, I estimate regressions in which I control for the relevant  demo- 
graphic characteri~tics.~  With this adjustment, we need a weaker assumption: 
conditional on observable characteristics, allocation into the treatment and the 
control groups is random. 
Identification is based on the assumption that there is no contemporaneous 
shock to relative labor market outcomes  of  women with large tax  cuts and 
women with small tax cuts. This assumption is somewhat fragile in this period. 
Evidence suggests that wage inequality grew significantly between  1979 and 
1987 (Katz and Murphy  1992). In addition, women with higher-income hus- 
bands tend to be more educated on average than women whose husbands have 
8. The choice of  the treatment group is guided by  data limitations, which  I  describe in  the 
9. Controlling demographic characteristics in a regression framework will solve the problem if 
next section. 
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less income. A rise in the relative wages of more-educated individuals would 
generate a response similar to that of a relative reduction in tax rates (Rosen 
1976). Only part of the estimated response would be due to tax reductions in 
that case. I test for shocks to relative labor market outcomes by  allowing the 
impact of education on labor market outcomes to vary over the period of the 
reforms. If  upper-income women increase their participation or work more 
hours because there is greater demand for them, this test will generate a more 
precise estimate of the tax effect. This test will also produce better estimates 
of the tax effect if there are any unobservable shocks to labor supply over the 
period that are correlated with education. An example of  such a shock would 
be that higher-income women prefer to work more hours at any wage following 
the tax law. 
A more basic identification condition is that the difference in the change in 
the after-tax wage for the two groups is not zero. Wages for nonparticipants do 
not exist, however. To avoid imputing market wages to nonparticipants, I as- 
sume instead that the difference in the after-tax share (1-marginal tax rate) 
between the two groups is not zero. In other words, I implicitly assume that 
relative wages remain unchanged. This assumption may not be valid given the 
endogeneity of the wage to tax reforms and the changes in returns to education 
during this period. I test this assumption later using the sample of  working 
women. 
Under the identifying assumptions, I can calculate the uncompensated elas- 
ticity of labor supply for the upper-income group as 
where H indexes the treatment group (high income), L indexes the control 
group (lower income), q  is the elasticity of labor supply, P refers to the labor 
supply measure, 1 -  8 is the after-tax share (1-marginal tax rate), and Ax is 
the percentage change in x. 
Because ERTA  reduced the tax liability of  taxpayers, the tax law  has an 
income effect and we estimate an uncompensated elasticity. This uncompen- 
sated elasticity is relevant for estimating tax revenue. Estimates of the elasticity 
are presented in the next section. I do not attempt to isolate the compensated 
effect, which is what matters for deadweight loss calculations. Eissa (1995) 
estimates compensated labor supply elasticities using TRA86, which was a 
revenue-neutral and a distributionally neutral tax change. 
1.5  Data and Basic Difference-in-Difference  Results 
1.5.1  Sample 
The data I use come from the 1981 and 1985 March CPS. The CPS provides 
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so the data are for tax years 1980  and 1984. I use 1984 as the postreform period 
because ERTA  was phased in over three years, with most of  the reductions 
taking place by 1983. 
The advantage of the CPS is that it is the largest data set with income and 
hours information available for the  relevant  years. The disadvantage is that 
income fields are top-coded and the top code changes between 1980 and 1984, 
from $50,000 to $100,000. The low top code in 1980 affects the marginal tax 
rate calculation for that year and therefore biases estimates of  the effect of 
ERTA on marginal tax rates. The direction of the bias is not clear, however. On 
one hand, the top code leads one to underestimate the marginal tax rate in 1980 
and thus the reduction in the tax rate over the period. On the other hand, top- 
coding of income leads one to overestimate the marginal tax rate if these tax- 
payers are eligible for the maximum tax.lo Approximately 29 percent of  the 
1980 sample with real other income of at least $50,000 has wage and salary 
income that is top-coded. To avoid misclassifying  individuals because of top- 
coded income, I define the treatment group to have at least $50,000 in other 
income,  the  sum  of  both  husband’s  earned  income  and  family  unearned 
income.” 
The CPS has information on households, families, and individuals. How- 
ever, the relevant unit of analysis for this study is the tax-filing unit. The tax- 
filing unit is based on CPS families. Therefore, subfamilies (both related and 
unrelated) are allocated to separate tax-filing units from the primary  family. 
Any member of the tax-filing unit who is under age 19 (or under age 24 and a 
full-time student) is considered a dependent child for tax purposes. Tax-filing 
unit income does not include children’s earned income or unearned income. 
The sample is made up of married women between ages 19 and 64, residing 
with their employed spouses at the time of the interview. I exclude women who 
report being self-employed because interpreting hours of work for this group 
is difficult. I also exclude women who report being out of the labor force be- 
cause of an illness or disability, or who repon working more than 4,160 hours 
per year (52 weeks at 80 hours per week). Finally, I exclude women with zero 
or negative other household income since these women are primary earners. 
The resulting sample size is 54,381 observations. 
Table 1.2 presents the characteristics of the sample. Column (1) presents the 
10. Recall that to be eligible for the maximum tax, a married taxpayer filing a joint return had 
to have taxable earned income in excess of $60,000  in  1980. An individual with $75,000 of taxable 
earned income will be classified as having $50,000 in my  data. This individual’s calculated mar- 
ginal tax rate is higher than his true marginal rate. 
11. Individuals may also be misclassified if they misreport their income to the CPS. Here, the 
difference-in-difference estimates of  the labor supply response are inconsistent. Scholz ( 1990) 
finds that tax units with wage and salary income more than $50,000 reported, on average, less 
income to the CPS than to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 1984. Tax units with wage and 
salary income between $25,000 and $50,000 reported very similar incomes in the two data sets. 
The estimate of the tax effect is biased downward if individuals underreport income to the CPS. 
Without a match between IRS and CPS data, however, correcting for this bias is difficult. 15  Labor Supply and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of  1981 
Table 1.2  Summary Statistics of Data Sample 
Variable 
All  Employed 
Before ERTA8 1  After ERTA8 1  Before ERTA8 1  After ERTA8 1 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Age  38.45  38.61  37.32  37.56 
(1  1.77)  (11.38)  (1  1.28)  (10.78) 
Education  12.28  12.56  12.58  12.87 
(2.61)  (2.63)  (2.48)  (2.50) 
Nonwhite  .083  ,090  .090  ,098 
(.275)  (.029)  (.029)  (.030) 
Preschool children  .419  ,416  ,344  ,357 
(.72)  (.712)  (.636)  (.650) 
Family size  3.323  3.233  3.210  3.142 
(1.31)  ( 1.24)  (1.24)  (1.16) 
Other household income  20,819  21,574  19,656  20,430 
(12,393)  (1 5,341)  (1  1,3  13)  (13,737) 
Interest and dividend income  741.4  1,219.2  630.0  1,018.8 
(3,176)  (5,153)  (2,825)  (4,287) 
Labor force participation  ,656  .687  1  1 
(.475)  (.464)  (0)  (0) 
(912.2)  (931.0)  (740.3)  (738.7) 
Hours  948.6  1,039.5  1,447.1  1,512.5 
Observations  29,269  25,112  19,186  17,259 
Nores: All income figures are in  1980 dollars. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Means 
are unweighted. 
characteristics  of  all  married  women  before  ERTA.  The average  married 
woman in the pretax change period is 38.45 years old, has a high school de- 
gree,  and  has  approximately  1.3  children.  Her  family  has  approximately 
$21,000 of other household income (defined as tax-filing unit income less the 
wife’s wage income) and $740 of interest and dividend income. The probability 
that she is employed is two-thirds. Column (2)  shows that after ERTA, she has 
similar characteristics.  l2 
Because I analyze the hours response for working married women, I present 
their  characteristics  as  well.  Column  (3) of  table  1.2 shows  that  working 
women are not very different from nonworking women: they are younger, are 
more educated, have a smaller family size, and are less likely to be white but 
only slightly so. Also, employed women have less other household income than 
women out of the labor force. 
Columns (1) and (2) show that the participation rate of all married women 
increased following the tax change: after ERTA, the labor force participation 
of married women increased by 3.1 percentage points, from 65.6 to 68.7 per- 
12. The tax reductions, and especially the secondary earner deduction, should reduce the mar- 
riage penalty and therefore affect marriage incentives. Therefore, either there was no mamage 
response, or newly married women are similar to those already married. 16  NadaEissa 
cent. The increase in labor force participation suggests that the populations of 
working women before and after the tax reforms may not be directly compar- 
able. New  participants  may  enter the  labor force at different points on the 
hours-of-work distribution. For the analysis, however, I assume that the distri- 
bution of hours of  work for new entrants is similar to that of  the pre-ERTA 
participants.  While  verifying  this  assumption  with  repeated  cross-sectional 
data is impossible, we can check that the demographic characteristics of the 
two groups look similar. Columns (3) and (4) show that the two populations 
are  quite  similar,  except  for the  number  of  preschool  children  they  have. 
Whereas all married women have fewer preschool children after 198  1, working 
married women have more preschool children. Therefore, new entrants into the 
labor force are more likely to be women with young children.I3 
1.5.2  Marginal Tax Rate 
I define the marginal tax rate variable as the sum of the federal, state, and 
social security payroll taxes on the individual's marginal revenue product: 
tmtr =[fmtr + (1 -  pitem*fmtr).smtr + 2.ssmtr]/(l + ssmtr), 
where tmtr is the total marginal tax rate, fmtr is the federal tax rate, pitem is 
the probability  that the individual itemizes deductions for the federal income 
tax, smtr is the state tax rate,  and ssmtr is the employer's  (also employee's) 
share of the social security payroll tax. 
The federal and state income tax rates are calculated using the NBER TAX- 
SIM model. Several income sources are used in the calculation: wage and sal- 
ary, interest, dividend, pension, self-employment, farm, and public assistance 
income. The CPS does not provide information on tax-filing status; therefore I 
assume that all couples file j0int1y.I~  TAXSIM computes the marginal tax rate 
from the tax  liability  incurred from an additional $100 of  wage and salary 
income. The deductibility of state taxes from the federal tax for taxpayers who 
itemize their deductions reduces the contribution of the state marginal tax rate. 
Since the CPS does not have information on itemization and deductions, I im- 
pute the probability that the individual itemizes from the Statistics of  Income 
as the share of tax returns that itemize deductions within each income clas~.'~ 
I assume full incidence of the FICA payroll tax on the worker.I6  In 1980, the 
13. Women with preschool children tend to work fewer hours than women with no young chil- 
dren once they enter the labor force. Thus new participants should be entering at a lower point in 
the hours distribution, shifting it to the left and reducing the estimated hours response. 
14. In 1980.96.8 percent of  married couples filed a joint tax return; in  1984, 98.2 percent did 
(Statistics of  Income). 
15. The income classes (in thousands of dollars) are 0-5,  5-10,  10-20,  20-30,  30-50,  50-75, 
75-100,  100-200, and 200-500. 
16. The social security payroll tax is a tax  only to the extent that the present value of taxes 
exceeds that of benefits. Feldstein and Samwick (1992) argue that married women face the full 
social security tax. 17  Labor Supply and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of  1981 
rate was  12.26 percent (6.13 percent on the employer). In  1984, the rate was 
14.00 percent. These rates are zero for any woman whose earnings exceed the 
social security maximum taxable earnings. 
Between 1980 and 1984, the average federal marginal rate for women in the 
sample fell by  only 1 percentage point, from 40.2 to 39.2 percent. The average 
reduction in the sample is much smaller than the statutory reduction contained 
in ERTA because of bracket creep and increases in the social security payroll 
tax. 
In the estimation, I rely on variation in marginal tax changes across the in- 
come distribution. Table  1.3 presents data on marginal tax rates before and 
after ERTA, disaggregated by the tax unit's other household income. Two ob- 
servations are noteworthy. First, the largest tax reduction went to individuals 
at the top of the income distribution: 5.2 percentage points for women in fami- 
lies with at least $50,000 in other household income. Second, bracket creep 
and  the  social security tax  completely offset the reductions in  ERTA  for 
women in the $10,000-$20,000  and $20,000-$30,000  income groups. At the 
very bottom of the other-income distribution, taxpayers received a 0.6 percent- 
age point reduction. Table  1.4 transforms these figures to percentage changes 
in the after-tax share (1-marginal tax rate). It shows that women at the top 
received a 12.33 percent increase in the after-tax share, whereas those at the 
very bottom received a 1.12 percent increase. 
1.5.3  Basic Labor Supply Results 
In this section, I present basic results on labor force participation and hours 
of work for married women at different points along the income distribution. 
Table 1.3  Marginal Tax Rate 
Groupa  Before ERTA8 1  After ERTA8 1  Change 
y 2  50  ,599  .547  -  ,052 
(.001)  (.001)  (.001) 
30 5 y < 50  ,520  ,496  -  ,024 
(.001)  (.001)  (.001) 
(.001)  (.001)  (.@I) 
(.001)  (.001)  (.001) 
y< 10  ,214  .268  -  ,006 
(.001)  (.002) 
20 5  y < 30  .431  ,431  .00 
10 5 y < 20  ,364  ,364  .oo 
Notes: Federal and state tax rates are calculated by TAXSIM.  I assume all couples file jointly and 
assign each unit the average itemized deductions for the income class. I assume that the full inci- 
dence of  the payroll tax falls on the worker. See text for details. Numbers in parentheses are 
standard errors. 
'Other household income in thousands of dollars. 18  NadaEissa 
Table 1.4  After-Tax Share 
Group"  Change (%) 




30 5 y < 50 
20 5 y <  30 
y<  10  1.12 
10 5 y <  20 
Nore: I assume that the growth rate of the real market wage is constant across groups. The reported 
figure is the difference in the group average of the log of the after-tax share between  1980 and 
1984. 
household income in thousands of dollars. 
Table 15  Labor Supply of Married Women Before and After ERTASl 
Group'  Before ERTA8 1  After ERTA8 I  Change 
y 2  50 
30 5  y < 50 
20 5 y < 30 
10sy<20 
y<  10 
y 2  50 
30 5 y < 50 
20 5 y < 30 
10 5 y <  20 
y<  10 
A. Labor Force Participation 
,419 (.014)  ,499 (.OH) 
w211  [ 1,1431 
,563 (.008)  ,618 (.008) 
[3,9471  [3,644) 
,649 (.005)  .695 (.006) 
W071  [6,5121 
,704 (.W)  ,723 (.005) 
[ 11.31 31  [9,0721 
,690 (.007)  ,707 (.007) 
[4,4811  [4,7391 
B. Annual Hours Conditional on Working 
1,265.9 (35.6)  1,395.9 (34.7) 
[5121  [5701 
1,369.7 (16.3)  1,428.6 (16.5) 
[2,2231  [2,2531 
1,432.6 (10.1)  1,527.5 (10.8) 
l5.3961  14.5251 
1,488.7 (8.0)  1,535.9 (8.9) 
[7,6921  L6.5581 
1,450.7 (13.6)  1,522.6 (12.7) 





















Notes: Each cell contains the mean for that group, along with standard error in parentheses, and 
number of observations in brackets or percentage increase in braces. Means are unweighted. 
"Other household income in thousands of dollars. 
Table 1.5 contains those results. The sample is disaggregated in the same way 
as in tables 1.3 and 1.4 to allow for comparison. Panel A presents participation 
results, and panel B presents hours of work for working  women. Each cell 
presents the average participation rate (or hours of work) for that group, stan- 
dard errors, and size of the sample. 
The primary  observation  from panel  A  is  that  labor  supply  of  married 19  Labor Supply and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
women was changing dramatically during the period for nontax reasons. Labor 
force participation increased even for those groups that saw no change in the 
marginal tax rate. 
The second observation is that women  whose marginal rates fell showed 
larger increases in labor force participation than those whose marginal rates 
were unchanged: those with spouses earning more than $50,000 increased their 
labor force participation by 8 percentage points, from 41.9 to 49.9 percent.” 
Those with spouses earning between $30,000 and $50,000 increased their par- 
ticipation rate by 5.5 percentage points. 
Clearly  the  8 percentage  point  increase in participation  at the  top of  the 
income  distribution  reflects  factors  other  than  the  effect  of  ERTA.  Using 
women below that income bracket, one can generate several different estimates 
of the response to ERTA. Each estimate entails different assumptions about the 
comparability of  the groups. I use the  $30,000-$50,000  group because it is 
closest to the treatment group. While having a control group whose marginal 
tax rate is unaffected by the tax law (such as the $20,000-$30,000  group) is 
preferable, the raw means suggest that the results would be similar. 
A comparison of the treatment and control groups suggests that participation 
of upper-income married women increased by 2.5 percentage points, or 6 per- 
cent. Over the same period, the relative after-tax share increased by approxi- 
mately 6.9 percent. The implied elasticity of participation is 0.86.18 
Panel B of  table  1.5 presents average annual hours of work for working 
women. It shows that, while the highest income group increased their hours of 
work significantly over the period (129.4 hours), so did working women mar- 
ried  to the poorest men  (72 hours). This pattern  is similar to that found by 
Bosworth and Burtless (1992) using data stratified into quintiles by family in- 
come. Overall, the pattern of annual work hours is far less continuous than that 
of participation. Recall, however, that it is a different group of women working 
after 1981 and that new participants may work fewer hours than existing parti- 
cipants. 
A comparison of the treatment and control groups suggests that annual hours 
of work by upper-income married women increased by 70.1 hours. This figure 
represents a 5.5 percent  increase in  annual hours of work. Dividing by  the 
corresponding relative increase in the after-tax share for working women (7.2 
percent) produces an elasticity of 0.77. The question to ask is whether this is a 
response to tax reduction or to a combination of wage growth and tax reduc- 
tions. If wages grew faster for the treatment group than the control group, esti- 
mates of the effect of ERTA are biased upward. Table 1.6 shows that the rela- 
tive gross hourly wage increased by 2.2 percent between  1980 and  1984 for 
17. All dollar amounts are in 1980 dollars. 
18. An alternative measure of the effect of the tax law is the share of nonparticipants drawn into 
the labor force. Because the two groups have different participation rates before the tax law, this 
measure need not generate similar conclusions. In this sample, the elasticity of nonparticipation 
is 0.62. 20  NadaEissa 
Table 1.6  Change in Gross Hourly Wage 
Groupa  Change (%) 
y I: 50  7.25 
30 5  y <  50  5.02 
20 5  y < 30  4.93 
10 5 y <  20  2.29 
y<  10  -  .57 
Note: Reported figures are for workers with hourly wages between $1 and $100 (1980 dollars). 
The change is the difference in the average log gross wage between 1980 and 1984. 
aOther household income in thousands of dollars. 
the relevant   group^.'^ The relative  increase in the after-tax wage for upper- 
income women becomes 9.4 percent. Using the difference in the after-tax wage 
suggests an annual hours-of-work elasticity of 0.58 (5.5/94).20 
Even after adjusting the estimates for wage growth, the responses suggested 
by the raw means are much larger than expected. Using very different method- 
ologies, Mroz  (1987)  and Triest  (1990)  estimate  uncompensated  hours-of- 
work elasticities that are close to zero for working married women. In the next 
section, I address the concern that differences in observable characteristics or 
changes in these characteristics over time may bias both the hours-of-work and 
the participation responses. 
1.6  Difference-in-Difference  Regressions 
Because women in the treatment group differ from women in the control 
group in characteristics that are relevant for labor supply, the observed relative 
differences in participation and hours of work may reflect the noncomparabil- 
ity of the groups rather than a response to ERTA. I control for such a possibility 
in this  section. After presenting the specification used, I discuss the regres- 
sion results. 
1.6.1  Specification 
generates the probit model for participation, specified as follows: 
Assuming that disutility of labor is normally distributed in the population 
(4) 
The hours-of-work equation is specified as follows: 
19. This number cannot be added to the results in table 1.4 because it is based on the sample of 
working women. Table 1.4 presents the figures for the entire sample. 
20. If lower taxes lead women to choose better-paying but less-attractive jobs, and the higher 
wage represents a compensating differential, then hours of work should not adjust to the higher 
wage. Here the response is both the higher hours and the greater pay per hour. The hours-of-work 
increase is 30 percent higher (2.2/7.2),  and the elasticity remains 0.77. 21  Labor Supply and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of  1981 
where i indexes individuals, t indexes time, k indexes the group, Zz,  and X,, are 
individual characteristics, TI  is a dummy equal to 1 for 1984 and equal to 0 for 
1980, High, equals 1 if real other household income is at least $50,000 (1980 
dollars) and equals 0 if real other household income is between $30,000 and 
$50,000, and p,, is an error. 
The set of covariates Z and X  are assumed to adequately control for alloca- 
tion into the treatment  group. The variables included are age, age squared, 
education, education squared, the number of preschool children, family size, a 
dummy for self-employed spouse, a race dummy (equal to 1 if the woman is 
nonwhite),  50 state dummies, and a dummy for residence  in a central city. 
Any unobservable differences in labor supply preferences between the various 
groups will be picked up by the income class dummy High,.  The coefficient 
on this variable is expected to be negative because higher-income women will 
purchase more leisure than their counterparts  further down the income dis- 
tribution. To control for common macroeconomic factors affecting the labor 
supply of married women, I include a year dummy. Because participation and 
hours are increasing over time, a2  and p,  should be positive. The behavioral 
response  to ERTA  will  be  reflected  in  the  coefficients  on  the  interaction 
T*High. A test that ERTA increased the labor supply of upper-income women 
is a test that a4  and P,  are greater than zero. 
Thus far, the tax unit's other income determines the group assignment. Be- 
cause the income distribution  shifts over time with productivity  growth, the 
number of families with real other household income of at least $50,000 should 
be greater  in  1984 than in  1980. Classifying  individuals using income may 
generate groups that differ in characteristics  over the period. Note that if the 
included covariates capture all differences,  estimates of the labor supply re- 
sponse will not be biased. Nonetheless, I generate different estimates by sort- 
ing individuals based on their percentile position in the income distribution. I 
classify women at or above the 95th percentile of the other income distribution 
as the treatment group and women between the 80th and 95th percentiles of 
the income distribution as the control group. 
1.6.2  Difference-in-Difference  Regression Results 
Labor Force Participation 
Table 1.2 showed that ERTA reduced taxes most for women with real other 
household income of at least $50,000. The raw data show that this group in- 
creased its participation by 6 percent and hours of work (by those employed) 
by 5.5 percent following the passage of the tax law. 
This section presents results for regressions that control for various observ- 
able characteristics. Two sets of estimates are presented in table 1.7. In the first 
set of regressions, women are classified by their tax unit's real other household 22  Nada Eissa 
Table 1.7  Difference-in-Difference  Probit Results: Labor Force Participation 
Level Classification  Percentile Classification 
Marginal 
Coefficient  Effect  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 





Children under age 6 
Nonwhite 









-.001  (.OW) 
-.010  (.046) 
.003 (.002) 
-  ,440 (.029) 
.183 (.069) 
,098 (.030) 





-.0116  .038 (.012) 
-.001  (.OOO) 
,0284  -.010  (.046j 
,003 (.002j 
-.1732  -.440  (.029) 
.0709  .I84 (.069) 
,012 (.012) 
,0386  -.058  (.161) 






.036 (.011)  ,036 (.012) 
,001 (.044)  ,001 (.044) 
,003 (.002)  .003 (.002) 
-  ,443 (.028) 
,206 (.065)  ,206 (.065) 
,010 (.011) 
,073 (.029)  -.059  (.153) 
-.392  (.041)  p.388 (.041) 
,039 (.058)  ,030 (.059) 
-6,805  -6,804 
10,871 
,014 (.021)  .011 (.022) 
0.42  0.33 
-.001  (.OOO)  -.001  (.OOO) 
-  ,443 (.028) 
Nores: Regressions include family size, 50 state dummies, a central city dummy, and a dummy for 
self-employed spouse. Data are from March CPS 1981 and  1985. High, equals  1 if real other 
household income exceeds $50,000 in cols. (1)-(3)  (the control group is women with other income 
between $30,000 and $50,000) and at or above the 95th percentile in cols. (4) and (5)  (the control 
group is women with other income between the 80th and 95th percentiles).  Numbers in parenthe- 
ses are standard errors. 
income. These results are comparable to those generated from tables 1.3, 1.4, 
and 1.5. The treatment group is women with real other household income of at 
least $50,000. The control group is women with real other household income 
between $30,000 and $50,000. In the second set of  regressions, women  are 
classified by their tax unit’s position in the other-income distribution. Columns 
(1)-(3)  present the former set of results, and columns (4) and (5) present the 
latter set of results. 
Column (1) presents  the probit coefficients  for equation (4). Because the 
probit is a nonlinear model, these coefficients are not equivalent to the mar- 
ginal effects of  the variables on participation. Column (2) presents the mar- 
ginal probabilities.2’ All estimated coefficients in the regression  have the ex- 
pected signs. Older women are less likely to be in the labor force: the marginal 
probability  is -  1.16 percentage points. One year of  education increases the 
probability of entering the labor force by 2.84 percentage points. The number 
21. To  generate the marginal effects, I multiply the normal density function (evaluated at the 
individual characteristics) by  the coefficient on the after-tax share. The estimates presented are 
sample averages. 23  Labor Supply and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of  1981 
of  preschool children reduces the likelihood that the mother enters the labor 
force, as does having a high-income spouse. 
The probit coefficient for the interaction variable is 0.080 (with a standard 
error of  0.062). I generate the treatment effect using the sample of  upper- 
income married women  observed after the tax  change. For each woman in 
that sample, I predict participation assuming that p,  is zero; I then predict 
participation at the estimated value of p,.  The difference in the sample average 
of the participation probabilities is the treatment effect. The predicted increase 
in participation is 3.0 percentage points (from a base of 47 percent), with a 
standard error of  2.3 percentage points.22  A simple calculation shows that the 
implied elasticity of labor force participation with respect to the after-tax share 
is 0.91 (6.3/6.9).23 
These calculations assume that the distribution of potential market wages of 
the treatment and the control group grew at the same rate between 1980 and 
1984. I test that labor demand explains part of the response by  adding a vari- 
able that interacts education with the time dummy (T).  The results are in col- 
umn (3). 
The education interaction is small and statistically insignificant and does 
not alter the overall results. The predicted response at the top of  the income 
distribution falls to 2.6 percentage points (with a standard error of  2.3), and 
the implied participation elasticity falls to 0.79. Changes in the returns to edu- 
cation, therefore, explain only 13 percent of the estimated response. This find- 
ing should not be surprising. The difference in average education between two 
groups is very small, less than one year. It seems that distinguishing between 
a common time effect and a differential education response in this sample is 
not possible, Note that the inclusion of  the education interaction makes the 
time dummy negative and insignificant. In fact, when evaluated at the average 
education level in the sample (13.58), the sum of  the time and the education 
coefficients (0.105) is very similar to the time coefficient in the basic regres- 
sion (0.098). 
Using income percentiles to define the various groups generates insignifi- 
cant participation responses that are of  the same order of  magnitude. Women 
at or above the 95th percentile of other-income distribution constitute the high- 
22. The asymptotic variance of  the estimated treatment effect is given by 
where G(6) is the treatment effect given by 
and 6 = estimated parameters, @ = normal cumulative distribution function, D  = treatment inter- 
action dummy, X, = regressors for individual i, and $ = normal density function. 
23. Note that this estimate does not necessarily imply that a 1 percent rise in the marginal tax 
rate will reduce participation by 0.9  I  percent. 24  NadaEissa 
income group. Women who fall between the 80th and 95th percentiles of the 
distribution constitute the control group. The results are presented in columns 
(4) and (5). The predicted response falls to a statistically insignificant  1.4 per- 
centage points. Accounting  for changes in the returns to education  reduces 
those figures further to 1.1 percentage points. These results imply a participa- 
tion elasticity of 0.33 with respect to the after-tax share. 
Controlling  for  demographic  characteristics  does  not  alter  the  basic 
difference-indifference estimates of ERTA’s effect on married women’s labor 
force participation. The range of participation responses is 1.1 to 2.6 percent- 
age points. 
Specijication  checks.  There remains  significant  variation  in  income,  both 
within groups and over time. Part of the time variation in income is artificial, 
however. The change in the top code (from $50,000 in the 1981 March CPS to 
$100,000 in the  1985 March CPS) increases the treatment group’s other in- 
come relative to that of the control group. This spurious increase in income 
generates a reduction in participation by upper-income women (by the income 
effect) and, as a result, increases the estimated effect of ERTA. To remove this 
bias, I top-code the husband’s wage and salary income at $50,000 (adjusted for 
inflation)  in  the  1985 March  CPS and generate  an  adjusted  other income, 
which I then include as a regressor in the participation equation. The inclusion 
of  the adjusted measure of other income does not affect the results. The esti- 
mated treatment effect increases to 3.2 percentage points in the level classifi- 
cation and 1.6 percentage points in the percentile classification. 
That upper-income women are observationally different from lower-income 
women leaves open the possibility  that the estimated responses are due to a 
contemporaneous shock correlated with observable characteristics. If the esti- 
mated response varies by race, we would be suspicious of the interpretation 
that ERTA caused the observed shift in labor supply. To check this possibility, 
I interacted age, race, family size, and children younger than six variables with 
the time dummy. The predicted response to ERTA remained unaffected. The 
results are also not sensitive to the use of education and cohort dummies. 
An additional concern is that the nonlinearity of the probit model drives the 
estimated response. The difference-indifference approach relies heavily on the 
linearity of the model. To gauge the bias from the nonlinearity of the model, I 
estimate linear probability models of the participation decision. The estimated 
responses mimic closely the predicted responses using the probit model: 3.2 
percentage points using the level classification and 1.4 percentage points using 
the percentile classification. 
Annual Hours of  Work 
Table 1.8 presents the hours-of-work regression results for working mamed 
women. Because the evidence suggests a participation response, we should be 
careful in interpreting the hours results without any correction for the selection 25  Labor Supply and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198  1 
Table 1.8  Differences-in-Differences  OLS Results: Annual Hours Conditional 
on Employment 
~ 
Level Classification  Percentile Classification 















35.30  (9.23)  35.89  (9.23) 
-.a9  (.109)  -.446  (.109) 
-  147.33  (42.66)  -  146.35  (42.42) 
6.29  (1.51)  5.91  (1.51) 
-  125.23  (24.02)  -  126.59  (24.01) 
221.61  (45.20)  222.51  (45.15) 
18.49  (9.07) 
24.15  (22.39)  -228.89  (124.42) 
-124.66  (38.37)  -  118.66  (38.56) 
61.76  (52.15)  49.91  (52.65) 
,090  .09  1 
5,558 
0.56  0.45 
33.17  (8.75)  32.98  (8.75) 
-.422  (.104)  -.420  (.104) 
-123.49  (39.81)  -122.16  (39.48) 
5.51  (1.41)  5.13  (1.41) 
-133.80  (22.49)  -135.06  (21.48) 
220.92  (42.09)  221.88  (42.06) 
18.17  (8.53) 
24.74  (21.41)  -223.42  (117.85) 
-111.04  (35.21)  -105.01  (35.36) 
32.89  (48.72)  21.02  (49.12) 
,089  ,089 
6,146 
0.34  0.22 
Notes: Regressions include family size, 50 state dummies, a central city dummy, and a dummy for self- 
employed spouse. Data are from March CPS 1981 and 1985. High, equals I if real other household income 
exceeds $50.000 in cols. (1) and (2) (the control group is women with other income between $30,000 and 
$50,000) and at or above the 95th percentile in cols. (3) and (4) (the control group is women with other 
income between the 80th and 95th percentiles). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
effect. If one could identify a shock to participation but not to hours of work, 
one could identify a selection model. ERTA, however, does not include any 
provisions that affect participation separately from hours of work. With that 
caveat in mind, I present the regression results. 
Column (1) of table  1.8 presents results  of equation  (5) using  OLS. The 
evidence for an hours-of-work response is weak. The table shows that, relative 
to women  in the next income group, upper-income  married women  worked 
61.76 more hours per year (with a standard error of 52.15). Purging the effect 
of changes in returns to education reduces the response to 48.8 hours. Using 
the percentile definitions, the estimate falls to 20 hours per year (with a stan- 
dard error of 49.12). Simple calculations suggest that the uncompensated elas- 
ticity of  hours of work is between 0.22 and 0.45. Therefore, controlling for 
observable characteristics reduces the hours-of-work response at the top of the 
income distribution. 
1.7  Standard Labor Supply Estimates 
I have argued that the difference-in-difference approach is preferable to the 
more standard approach of estimating labor supply equations because  it does 
not rely explicitly on any measure of  the net wage. That is an advantage be- 26  Nada Eissa 
cause the net wage is measured with error. Heckman (1993) notes that “CPS- 
type wage measures have a very low signal-to-noise ratio.” Of course, the mar- 
ginal tax rate will also be measured with error since survey data generally does 
not include deductions or exemptions. Therefore, the net wage coefficient in a 
standard labor supply equation will be biased downward. If the measurement 
error  averages  to  zero  in  the  defined  income  classes,  however,  then  the 
difference-in-difference results are unbiased. In this section, I compare the pre- 
vious results with standard labor supply estimates. 
1.7.1  Labor Force Participation 
Table 1.9 presents the results for the labor force participation equation: 
The covariate  set  Q  includes  the  same  covariates  as in  the  difference-in- 
difference regressions, 0 is the marginal tax rate on the participation margin, 
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Nofes: Other covariates include family size, a dummy for self-employed spouse, 50 state dummies, 
and a central city dummy. Data are from March CPS 1981 and 1985. In cols. (3) and (4), I include 
10 income class dummies (see text for definition). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
“Marginal effect is given by  [I$  (xp)]*p, where 6  is the standard normal density evaluated using 
the estimated parameters and f3  is the estimated coefficient. 
bThe elasticity in col. (4) refers to high-income women (other income of at least $50,000). 27  Labor Supply and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of  1981 
and y,, is the tax unit’s after-tax income, excluding the wife’s income. I estimate 
several specifications of this model. 
The probit coefficients of  equation (6) are in column (1) of table 1.9, and 
the marginal probabilities are in column (2). The marginal effects are similar 
to those estimated in the difference-in-difference regression. The estimate sug- 
gest that an additional year of education increases the likelihood that a married 
woman enters the labor force by 3.27 percentage points, as compared to 2.86 
percentage  points  in  the  difference-in-difference  regression.  Older,  white 
women with preschool children are less likely to be in the labor force, again in 
similar magnitudes to what the previous estimates suggest. 
The coefficient on the log of  the after-tax share is 0.622, with a standard 
error of 0.078. The marginal effect, presented  at the bottom of  the table, is 
0.21  9 (with a standard error of 0.027).24  To calculate the elasticity of participa- 
tion, I divide the marginal probability by the average participation rate in the 
sample (0.671). A 1 percent increase in the after-tax share leads to a 0.32 per- 
cent increase in labor force participati~n.~~ 
Both cross-sectional and time variations in marginal tax rates identify the 
tax effect. The cross-sectional variation in taxes derives largely from differ- 
ences in income and family size, creating a potential identification problem. If 
the relationship between these variables and hours of work is nonlinear, then 
the after-tax share variable may reflect these nonlinearities rather than the tax 
effect. To account for this possibility, I reestimated the participation equation 
with 10  dummies for other-household income.26  Column (3) of table 1.9 shows 
that the tax coefficient declines by  almost 50 percent, from 0.622 to 0.330 
(with a standard error of 0.095). Including income class dummies reduces the 
marginal effect to 11.6 percentage points and the elasticity to 0.17. 
One explanation for these results might be that income dummies removed 
time (and cross-sectional) variation in marginal tax rate. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 
show that the tax changes were correlated with income. If this were the entire 
story, however, we should have observed an increase in the standard error and 
no change in the tax coefficient. The more plausible  explanation is that the 
relationship  between  other household  income and  labor force participation 
24. The result is not very different if calculated at the characteristics of the average woman. 
25. It is convenient to use the after-tax share because wages are not observed for those who are 
not working. Nonetheless, wages can be imputed for nonworkers. I do so by  using Heckman’s 
(1979) technique for correcting for sample selection bias. I predict the hourly wage by estimating 
a wage equation (using the sample of working women) in which I include the following demo- 
graphic variables: age and education (in levels and higher-order terms), an age-education interac- 
tion, dummies for time, state, race, and central city residence, and a sample selection term. Using 
the estimated coefficients from the wage equation, I predict an hourly wage for each woman in 
the sample. The results for the regression that includes the net wage variable suggest that taxes 
have a much stronger effect on participation: the elasticity on the participation margin is 0.59. The 
problem with this procedure is that identification is derived from functional form assumptions. 
26. The dummies are defined for the following group: y 2  $50,000,  and at $5,000 intervals for 
incomes below $50,000. The excluded dummy is $40,000 5  y < $45,000. 28  Nada Eissa 
is nonlinear  and that the coefficient on the after-tax share reflects  this non- 
linearity. 
The difference-in-difference results suggest a participation elasticity much 
larger than the 0.17 estimated here.  Might it be the case that upper-income 
women are more responsive than the “average” woman? The results in column 
(4) show that upper-income women do, in fact, have higher participation elas- 
ticities than the average woman, although the difference is not statistically sig- 
nificant. The coefficient on the after-tax  share (for high-income  women) is 
0.668, and the implied elasticity is 0.32. 
Measurement error in the after-tax share resulting from the fact that deduc- 
tions and exemptions are imputed may still bias this estimate downward. If this 
measurement  error averages to zero in the defined income classes, then  the 
difference-in-difference  estimates are preferable to the standard model  esti- 
mates. 
1.7.2  Annual Hours of Work 
Table 1.10 presents results for the hours-of-work equation: 
(7) 
where X,,  includes the same covariates as the participation regression. The in- 
come variable used in these regressions is “virtual” income. The wage variable 
is constructed in the usual method: by dividing wage and salary income by 
annual hours of  work. The after-tax wage is the product of  the hourly wage 
and the after-tax share. 
Column (1) presents the 
OLS results. Again  all estimated coefficients in the regression  have the ex- 
pected  signs. Women work fewer hours as they get older. Nonwhite women 
and women with preschool children also work fewer hours, as do women with 
more virtual income. 
I estimate the regressions using the observed net wage without correcting 
for self-selection. This regression produces  an after-tax  wage coefficient  of 
53.89 hours. To  translate this into an elasticity, I divide the coefficient by the 
average annual hours worked in the sample (1,478). The uncompensated elas- 
ticity of hours of work with respect to the after-tax wage is 0.03. 
To  address the endogeneity of  the marginal tax rate and virtual income to 
hours worked, I use the net wage and the unit’s after-tax income at the zero 
hours margin as instrumental variables.28  The 2SLS estimates are presented in 
Table 1.10 presents the basic regression 
27. The sample size for these regressions is smaller than that reported in table 1.2 because the 
log of  the wage is undefined for women who have a zero wage (volunteers). 
28. The first-hour marginal tax rate is a valid instrument if  it is correlated with the actual mar- 
ginal rate and uncorrelated with the error in the hours equation. In my sample, it is easy to defend 
the first assumption: the correlation between the marginal rate and its instrument is 0.44. It is not 
so easy to defend the second assumption, however. The error in the labor supply equation may be 
correlated with the first-hour rate if we imagine an assortative mating process. Suppose that higher- 29  Labor Supply and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of  1981 
Table 1.10  Standard Labor Supply Model OLS and 2SLS Results: Annual 
Hours Conditional on Employment 
OLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
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52.27 (2.81)  52.11 (2.83) 
-.662  (0.04)  -.660  (0.04) 
-  136.79 (7.25)  -  137.56 (7.25) 
133.19 (13.88)  134.58 (13.89) 
-6.00  (0.46)  -6.09  (1.69) 
102.88 (4.72)  102.39 (4.73) 
Yes  Yes 
No  Yes 
,082  ,084 
35,85 1 
0.07  0.07 
52.02 (2.83) 
-.659  (0.04) 
-  137.56 (7.25) 
134.00 (13.89) 
-5.75  (1.69) 
106.09 (4.90) 





Nores: Regressions also include family size, a dummy for self-employed spouse, 50 state dum- 
mies, and a central city dummy. Data are from March CPS 1981 and 1985. Numbers in parentheses 
are  standard errors. The sample here includes only women with hourly wages between $1  and 
$100 (1980 dollars). The instrument in the 2SLS regression is the first-hour, after-tax wage. In 
cols. (3)  and (4),  I include 10 income class dummies (see text for definition). 
aThe elasticity in col. (4) refers to high-income women (other income of at least $50,000). 
column  (2). The coefficient  on the log of the net wage increases to  102.88 
(statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence interval). Nonetheless, the 
elasticity of hours of work, 0.07, remains very small. In column (3), I reestim- 
ate the hours-of-work equation by adding  10 income class dummies (defined 
as in the participation equation). Here, time variation in after-tax wages rather 
than cross-sectional variation  identifies the hours equation. The inclusion of 
income dummies does not affect the results: the after-tax wage coefficient re- 
mains  102.39 (with a standard error of 4.73). The hours-of-work  equations 
do not  seem to exhibit the nonlinear relationship with income found in the 
participation equations. 
The uncompensated  elasticity  estimates  in  columns  (2)  and  (3)  predict 
hours-of-work responses to ERTA that are much smaller than those estimated 
in  table  1.8.  Moreover,  allowing  a  separate  coefficient  for  upper-income 
women does not reduce this divergence (col. [4]).  The coefficient on the inter- 
action variable (High*log(Net wage)) is negative and statistically significant: 
income men have stronger tastes for work and they tend to marry women that are like them. Be- 
cause it implies a positive correlation between tastes for work and first-hour tax rates, assortative 
mating would bias the coefficient on the net wage variable upward. 30  Nada Eissa 
the elasticity of labor supply for high-income women is only 0.04, smaller than 
for the “average” woman in the sample. 
Elasticities derived from basic hours-of-work equations are generally lower 
than those generated using difference-in-difference methods. One explanation 
for this divergence is measurement error in the net wage. Evidence suggests 
that there is significant measurement error in the wage and that it is negatively 
correlated with hours of work (Mroz 1987). Such error would bias the coeffi- 
cients in the standard model toward zero. If this measurement error averages to 
zero in the income classes defined, then the difference-in-difference regression 
results are unbiased (Wald 1940; Angrist 1991). In addition, the standard labor 
supply models estimated were the most basic models. No attempt was made to 
address biases due to wage endogeneity or sample selection in the hours-of- 
work equations. Nonetheless, the results generated are consistent with those of 
Mroz (1987), who carefully controlled for sample selection and wage endo- 
geneity. 
1.8  Conclusion 
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of  1981 reduced marginal tax rates by 23 
percent within each tax bracket. In addition, ERTA introduced a tax deduction 
of  10 percent of the secondary earner’s income up to $30,000. Together, these 
changes  produced  a  significant  reduction  in  marginal  tax  rates  for  upper- 
income individuals and a smaller reduction for lower-income individuals. I use 
the variation  in marginal tax rates to estimate both difference-in-difference 
regression  models (where I compare the change in  labor supply  for upper- 
income women  with change  in labor supply for lower-income women)  and 
standard labor supply models (where labor supply is a function of the after- 
tax wage). 
Using data from the 1981 and 1985 Current Population Survey, I find weak 
evidence that labor force participation of upper-income married women is re- 
sponsive to taxes. The point estimates suggest that following ERTA, upper- 
income married women increased their labor force participation by up to 2.6 
percentage points (from a predicted base of 47 percent). That estimate suggests 
an elasticity of 0.79. For  working women, the most likely values show a re- 
sponse between  20 and 49 hours per year, but these are estimated with such 
imprecision that it is not possible to rule out no response at all. Finally, stan- 
dard labor supply estimates predict participation and hours-of-work responses 
for upper-income women that are at the lower end of the observed responses. 
A likely explanation for the divergence between the difference-in-difference 
results and the standard model results is measurement error in the marginal tax 
rate and in the gross wage. This measurement error biases the standard esti- 
mates downward. The difference-in-difference results, however, would be un- 
biased  if  the measurement error averages to zero for the income groups de- 
fined. 31  Labor Supply and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
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Comment  James J. Heckman 
This paper adopts an atheoretical stance toward measuring the effect of taxes 
on labor supply. It offers a dramatic contrast to the paper by Hausman that I 
discussed at the  1981 NBER conference held in Florida on measuring the ef- 
fect of taxes on behavior (see Heckman 1982). 
The earlier Hausman paper offered a tightly structured model of taxes and 
labor supply that exploits all the information in the data and in the theory and 
adds a lot of econometric structure to produce tax estimates that are not cred- 
ible. I pointed out that Hausman lacked information about the true budget con- 
straint facing  potential  workers  and  his  assumptions  produced  statistically 
inconsistent estimators even granting the arbitrary distributional and functional 
form assumptions. My concerns were validated in a paper by MaCurdy, Green, 
and Paarsch (1990) who found (1) that they could not even reproduce Haus- 
man’s estimates using Hausman’s methods and Hausman’s sample, (2) that ro- 
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bust estimates show essentially zero wage and income effects for male labor 
supply, and (3) that simpler and more plausible methods of estimation produce 
estimates of labor supply that agree with the estimates from the complex meth- 
ods properly applied. 
The absurd labor supply estimates produced by the “structural” econometric 
approach led a whole generation of empirically oriented scholars to reject for- 
mal econometric methods and to adopt a series of  substitutes for rigorous 
econometrics. The  move  toward  social  experiments, natural  experiments, 
difference-in-difference methods, and Wald estimators represents a yearning 
for simplicity, familiarity, and robustness in frameworks for conducting empiri- 
cal work in economics. 
In contrast to a more economically explicit style of doing empirical work, 
the economics in this new empirical methodology is kept implicit, and the 
discussion of  crucial identifying assumptions is  also kept  implicit. Many 
people like to keep their econometrics at an intuitive level and to agree, collec- 
tively, on what constitutes a “natural experiment” or an “instrument.” Given 
the power of  networks in our profession, this agreement to suppress explicit 
discussion of identifying assumptions and to suppress use of explicit economic 
measuring frameworks is likely to have a long life. 
The new conventions should be recognized as just that: agreements among 
groups of like-minded persons to keep things simple and intuitively plausible. 
There is another way  to settle these issues, however, and that is to uniformly 
apply the standards of credibility. Thus while Hausman’s framework and empir- 
ical evidence is properly dismissed as arbitrary and unconvincing, it should 
also be noted  that  the widely  used  difference-in-difference method is also 
strongly functional form dependent. It requires additive separability between 
observed and unobserved variables. It requires that the unobservables have a 
special time-series structure. It assumes that common trends operate on both 
treatments and controls, and it rarely identifies parameters of economic inter- 
est. Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1995), cited by  Eissa, demonstrate how 
very strong functional form assumptions are required to justify the application 
of difference-in-difference methods to estimate economically interpretable pa- 
rameters. I amplify this point below.  The available experimental evidence 
speaks strongly against the difference-in-difference  method. LaLonde’s widely 
acclaimed  study (1986), which  contributed to  the  distrust of  econometric 
methods and the call for experiments, documented that the method gave very 
poor estimates. Heckman and Smith (1995) report similar evidence. The only 
thing going for the method and the closely related fixed-effects strategy is 
computational convenience. 
The economic parameter being estimated is never defined in terms of con- 
ventional income and substitution effects measured in other studies. Thus it is 
difficult to compare Eissa’s estimates with those from other studies, even other 
difference-in-difference studies, since the method is so strongly dependent on 
particular sample paths for conditioning variables. The 1981 tax reform had 34  Nada Eissa 
the effect of  raising  the after-tax wages of  women  from families with high 
income compared to those from families with low income. It also had the effect 
of raising the after-tax income of their husbands. It reduced the marginal tax 
rate on capital income from a top rate of 70 percent to 50 percent and changed 
other rates below the top as well. The net effect of the reforms on labor supply 
is ambiguous because the after-tax wage of women was higher, encouraging 
an increase in their labor supply, but the after-tax income of  their husbands 
was higher, encouraging a reduction in female labor supply. The labor supply 
response estimated by Eissa is neither a compensated nor an uncompensated 
effect of taxes on female labor supply as conventionally defined because differ- 
ent tax changes apply to wage and capital gains income. Therefore, the author 
cannot reasonably compare her estimates to those from the previous literature 
that identified those effects. 
The estimation strategy adopted in this paper relies critically on the classifi- 
cation of women into “high”  and “low” cells based on pretax household in- 
come, excluding the wife’s earnings but including other joint capital income, 
and assumes that taxes do not affect membership in this classification-the 
conditions required for application of the Wald estimator. Even if male labor 
supply has a zero wage elasticity, as the author assumes and as MaCurdy et al. 
effectively demonstrate, capital income is well known to have a high tax elas- 
ticity. If some women change categories as a result of the reduced tax on asset 
income, the effect is to violate the fixed grouping assumption of the Wald esti- 
mator. Presumably the  net  shift is that some “low”  women become “high” 
women as their families adjust capital incomes. 
Bias in the Estimator 
consider the following table for log hours of work: 
To be more precise about the nature of the bias resulting from this violation, 
Low Income  High Income 
New tax  C  A 
Old tax  D  B 
Let P, be the proportion of women who move from D to A in response to the 
effect of the tax change on capital gains and other income. Assume no shifting 
across other cells. Let E be log labor supply. EO(l,  T) is the log of hours worked 
under the old tax regime by low-income people who will transfer to the high- 
income group. EO(l,  T) is the log hours worked in the old tax regime by low- 
income people who will stay in the low regime. En  (1, T) is the labor supply in 
the new regime for those initially low-income people who do not switch status. 
Let EO(h)  be the log hours worked by high-income people in the old tax re- 
gime. Let E”(h) be the log hours worked in the new regime. 
Eissa defines her parameter of interest to be 
[(A -  B) -  (C -  D)]/[Aln(l -  t)(h) -  Aln(1 -  t)(l)] 
where A, B,  C,  and  D  stand  for  mean  of  log  hours  worked  in each cell. 
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Aln (1 -  t)(  h) -  Aln (1 -  t)(l) = At 
to be the change (in logs) of the after-tax share of wages between high income 
women and low income women. 
A = E"(h), 
C = PTE"(l,  T) + (1 -  PT)E"(l, T) 
D = PTE"(l,  T) + (1 -  PT)Eo(I,  T). 
B = Eo(h) 
For simplicity I use geometric means. What Eissa actually estimates is 
[(A* -  B)  -(C* -  D)]/At, 
where, letting Nh be the number of people in the high-income regime and N, 
the number in the low-income regime, both measured in the base state, 
A* = WE"(h) + (1 -  w)E"(l, T), 
C*  = E" (1, T), 
and 
Then the bias for her parameter is 
([(A" -  B) -  (C* -  D)] -  [(A -  B) -  (C -  D)]}/At 
= [(A* -  A) -  (C* -  C)]/At 
= [(l -  W)  (E"(1, T) -  E"(h)) -  P,(E"(l,  T) -  E"(1, T))]/At. 
It  is  plausible  that  income  effects  on  labor  supply  yield  the  ordering 
En(  1, T) -  En(  h) >  0, but it is also plausible that En(  1, T) -  En(  1, T) > 0. Thus 
the direction of the bias for Eissa's parameter depends on the disparity in the 
new tax situation between the mean log labor supply of the transferees relative 
to those who stay in the high and low cells. The women shifting into cell A 
raise the labor supply there but by leaving cell C they raise the average there 
as well. The larger the transferees are as a proportion of women in the postre- 
form high cell, and the larger the gap is between transferee labor supply and 
the labor supply of the initially high-income women, the more likely it is that 
her estimate is upward biased. The smaller the transferees are as a proportion 
of the pretax low-income households, and the farther apart the new tax regime 
labor supply of transferees and nontransferees is, the more likely it is that her 
estimate is downward biased for her parameter. 
Dependence on Functional Form and Assumptions about Time Paths 
of Regressors 
The extreme dependence  of the difference-in-difference estimator on the 
functional form of the labor supply equation and implicit assumptions about 36  NadaEissa 
movement  of  the exogenous variables  over time between  the  high and low 
groups can also be exhibited within this framework. To discuss this issue, I 
ignore the crossover problem just discussed. 
Write AE(h) as the change in log labor supply between the old and new tax 
regime for persons in the high group. AE(1) is the change in log labor supply 
for the low group. As before, Aln (1 -  t)(h) is the change in log marginal tax 
rates for the high group, and Aln (1 -  t)(l) is the change in the log marginal 
tax rate for the low group. Let Aln X(h) be the change in other characteristics 
for the high group, and let Aln X(l) be the change in the other characteristics 
for the low group. Let AU(h) be the change in the unobservables for the high 
group, and AU(1) be the change in the unobservables for the low group. 
In finite changes, 
AE(h) = a,(h)Aln (1 -  t)(h) + a,(h)AlnX(h)  + AU(h) 
AE(1) = a,(l)Aln (1 -  t)(l) + a,(l)Aln X(l) + AU(1) . 
Eissa’s estimator  of  wage  response  is the  difference  of  the  average  of  the 
changes within each group: 
AE(~)  -  AE@  AE(~)  -  AE(~)  -  -___~ 
Aln (1 -  t)(h) -  Ah  (1 -  t)(l)  At  ’ 
where the overbar denotes average. She implicitly assumes that a,(h) -  a,(1) 
(no wealth effect on the response of a change in taxes on labor supply), a,(h) = 
a,(l)  (other variables  have the same marginal effect on log labor supply at 
different wage levels), and AFX(h) = ATX(1) (the other characteristics, such 
as child bearing, age, wages, etc. change in the same way in logs between the 
groups) and 
plim [zU(h) -  xU(l)] = 0, 
so that sample differences in the changes in unobservables  between high and 
low converge to zero. Thus she implicitly makes strong functional form as- 
sumptions as well as assumptions about the time profiles in logs of the explana- 
tory variables X(h) and X(1) in the two groups. She ignores the effects of taxes 
on the entry and exit of  persons into the workforce and the effects of  these 
compositional changes on estimated labor supply parameters-a  major theme 
of the literature on selection bias surveyed in Killingsworth’s survey of  labor 
By adopting an atheoretical approach, the author throws away a potentially 
important source of information for identifying wage and tax effects on labor 
supply: the demand-induced change in real wages that highly educated women 
experienced in her sample period. The only advantages in not using the wage 
information are that she can assume that her women suffer from tax illusion 
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and  she can avoid  standard measurement  error  and  simultaneous  equation 
problems in the use of wages in labor supply equations. However, all the evi- 
dence in the literature argues that the after-tax wage is relevant to labor supply 
decisions. Wage and tax effects in logs should have the same effects on labor 
supply. Averaging as she does should greatly attenuate mean zero measurement 
error and simultaneous equations problems. Thus it is not clear that she gains 
anything by not using the wage data. 
Instead of  using wage growth to help identify tax effects on labor supply, 
she adopts an ad hoc method for eliminating the effects of demand growth on 
wages and hence on labor supply. She throws wages into the X(h) and X(l) 
variables and therefore is forced to take steps to undo the consequences of the 
false assumption that high-income women have had the same wage growth as 
low-income women. Positive assortative mating on education coupled with the 
greater trend in wage growth for more educated women argues strongly against 
such an assumption. Part of her estimated tax effect is due to differential wage 
growth, but it would be better to constrain the tax coefficients and the wage 
coefficients to allow the variation in the wage growth to inform the estimation 
of tax effects. 
The pendulum has swung too far away from using economics as a means 
of interpreting economic data. Wage variation should be used as a source of 
identifying information and not as a problem to be eliminated, especially when 
a substantial component of the growth is demonstrably exogenous to individual 
decisions, as was the wage growth of 1980s.  Trends and demand shocks would 
provide “natural instruments” for wages. 
Finally, the comparison  of Eissa’s estimate  with those obtained from her 
interpretation of conventional econometric models of labor supply is not con- 
vincing.  Econometrics  has advanced  beyond  the  simple probit  model,  and 
discrete-choice models that allow for more general forms of nonlinearity are 
now widely available.’ Even the probit model could be made more flexible by 
incorporating nonlinearities in the arguments of the model. It is not an essential 
feature  of  probit  analysis to constrain  the  estimates  to be linear  functions 
within the probit argument or to make tax or wage effects uniform across in- 
come levels. The contrast between the constrained probit estimates and her 
estimates is thus somewhat contrived. 
Many methods are available for handling the problem of measurement error 
in wages. The labor supply equation estimated in this paper is much more like 
the  “first  generation”  studies  (as  labeled  by  Killingsworth)  than  like  the 
second-generation  studies which consider simultaneity,  selectivity, and mea- 
surement error. Her specification does not distinguish between self-selection 
effects of wages and the effects of wages on labor supply. Models and methods 
1, See Todd (1995). who demonstrates that in many cases the models of nonparametric discrete 
choice make little difference in a wide array of applications. Her results suggest that probit models 
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for estimating labor supply functions under more robust conclusions are avail- 
able. It would be of  interest to estimate these models before the strategy of 
estimating interpretable economic models is rejected out of hand. 
Summary 
Difference-in-difference  methods are functional  form dependent and pro- 
duce interpretable  economic parameters  only under very special conditions. 
Difference-in-difference  estimates are not even comparable across studies of 
the same type because policy-invariant structural parameters are not estimated 
and different studies condition on different variables and different levels of the 
variables. In this application, the estimates produce a tax effect on labor supply 
that has no clear economic interpretation  and that cannot be compared with 
estimates from the structural labor supply literature. Moreover, the classifica- 
tion scheme of “high” and ‘‘low’’ family incomes is likely to be affected by 
taxes, violating a key assumption of the Wald estimation method used in this 
paper. 
The reaction to the implausible labor supply models of  the early 1980s has 
gone too far. It is time to bring economics back to the study of labor supply 
and taxes. Credible methods exist to estimate economically interpretable labor 
supply parameters that can be compared across studies and that can be used to 
address problems of economic interest. 
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